FIELD REPORT

REFUGEES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE WESTERN CAPE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Deji Olukotun

More than twenty-five Somali refugees were killed in Cape Town, South Africa, in the month of July alone.  Since then, a variety of actors – from government to community-based organizations – have come forth to address the root causes of the murders.  Their efforts have revealed that these attacks were not isolated incidents of crime, but part of a pattern affecting refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa.  Poverty, xenophobia, and governmental apathy all contributed to the attacks. 

The first part of this field report will provide a general background of the conditions facing refugees in South Africa.  In the second part, these themes will be explored in the specific case study of Masiphumelele, a Cape Town community in which a number of violent attacks were perpetrated on refugees.

Part I: Background

Prior to 1994, South Africa was a refugee producing country.  Nationals fleeing the apartheid regime sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe and further afield.  The country’s ‘refugee’ policies were subject to racial politics typical of the apartheid government.  While blacks could not seek asylum in South Africa, whites fleeing the arrival of black majority rule in other African countries were permitted to become full citizens of South Africa.  The post-apartheid government was faced with the challenge of reversing this policy; where black refugees were formally excluded from entering South Africa before, they were now welcomed according to established conventions of international law. 

Refugees now flow into South Africa at a significant rate and the Rainbow Nation has had difficulties accommodating them.  Since 1994, approximately 220,000 asylum applications have been lodged in the country.  At the governmental level, the Department of Home Affairs is notoriously inefficient and disorganized.  At the local level, South African nationals view refugees as competing for scarce jobs and resources.  This combination has made life for refugees fleeing persecution extremely difficult and, at times, dangerous. 

The Role of the Government

The South African government elected to adopt a rights-based approach to refugee protection rather than an encampment policy.  Upon receiving a temporary permit, an asylum seeker may work, study, and receive the full protection of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.  Hospital care and primary schooling are guaranteed.  This has resulted in a sink or swim situation.  For highly skilled refugees or those that assimilate quickly into society, the rights-based approach is a boon.  However, for recent arrivals, particularly those suffering from post-conflict trauma, the result can be devastating.  Language difficulties and other differences are compounded by the inability to access the many social services, such as child support grants, that are available to South African nationals.

The composition of South Africa’s refugee community is changing.  In the late 1990s and early part of this decade, thousands of Angolans fled a raging civil war.  A peace accord in that country has resulted in the voluntary repatriation of many Angolans.  There is speculation that the Angolan government may be negotiating a government-to-government agreement about the status of the refugees currently living in South Africa. 

Certain conflicts presently affect the refugee community in South Africa.  These include the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi, and Rwanda.  The ongoing conflict in Somalia and the slum clearance schemes in Zimbabwe also impact the refugee population.  Refugees from the Sudan and Chad occasionally appear but are not common.  Much smaller numbers from all over the world – from Palestine to Pakistan to the Niger delta  – are also marginally represented in the community. 

The sheer number of asylum applicants that have arrived in South Africa has overwhelmed the Department of Home Affairs, which is responsible for refugee matters.  In order to obtain refugee status, an asylum seeker should report the purpose of entry at the border and duly report to a Refugee Reception Office run by the department. Asylum seekers routinely visit the Reception Offices for weeks without being seen, queuing as early as five in the morning in the hope of securing a permit.  Some local entrepreneurs make a small living off delays, rising early to stand in line and offering people to take their spot for a small fee.  The delays are completely humiliating to refugees, with staff members hurling abuses at them or closing the doors on a whim.  Home Affairs documents sometimes view asylum seekers with suspicion and accuse them of being fraudulent. 

The Refugee Backlog Project

Home Affairs responded to the overwhelming numbers of asylum seekers by creating dedicated backlog offices in 2006.  These offices process all asylum seekers who arrived before July 31, 2005, whose status has not been determined.  The offices have, for the most part, functioned well in speeding up the status determination process.  The Nyanga office in Cape Town, for example, has been addressing a backlog of over 20,000 refugees in an efficient manner.  However, an increase in arrivals from Zimbabwe and other countries has resulted in a new backlog of at least 12,000 at the regular reception office in Cape Town according to the local backlog program director.  The backlog offices, then, do not seem to be a durable solution.  The department would benefit from analyzing their strengths and increasing capacity at the regular reception offices.

The Role of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR, the refugee agency of the United Nations, plays a monitoring and supportive role in South Africa.  Rather than administer refugee camps as it does in Tanzania and Zambia, UNHCR funds legal and social “implementing partners” to assist refugees.  However, a lack of resources does not provide enough support for recent arrivals for more than a few months, to the extent that some refugees state they would prefer to be accommodated in a camp.  Certain asylum seekers, in rare cases, utilize the opportunity to launch businesses or study. 

Part II: the Masiphumelele case study

The Somali Refugee Conflict in South Africa

The Somali conflict in the Cape Town community of Masiphumelele provides a fascinating case study of the plethora of issues confronting refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa. 

Understanding the conflict requires a brief mention of the economic status of South Africa.  Any description of its complex history is imbued with political content, and must be taken with a grain of salt.  Loosely, a key factor that precipitated the transition from apartheid was the failing economy.  Majority rule was needed for business and prosperity.  The post-apartheid government responded with an ambitious economic program, but, electing not to default on unpaid loans, soon switched to a more conservative economic platform.  Ninety-four percent of land remains in the hands of the 9.9 percent white minority.  And, despite a growing economy, unemployment estimates range as high as 40 percent.

In this context, many South Africans feel threatened by the arrival of refugees, who they consider to be taking their jobs.  Unlike skilled foreigners, refugees must live in the townships and shanty towns.  They often visibly stand out from locals due to their clothing, language, and cultural mannerisms, even after learning the local language. 

Somalis have experienced considerable difficulty integrating into the Western Cape province.  They can easily be distinguished from South African nationals, and frequently fall victim to xenophobia.  Although some have proven to be successful business persons, operating cornershops and restaurants, others cannot find steady work or accommodation.  Many Somalis are recognized refugees but do not possess the ID book necessary to open a bank account, and must keep cash in their shops or homes.  They are not able to legally possess weapons and they often lack social networks to protect themselves.

The Masiphumulele Conflict

An estimated thirty Somali men were killed in the months of July and August 2006 in the Western Cape province.  These attacks occurred in a variety of towns, including George, Worcester, and Khayelitsha.  Some deaths, such as a shooting in Mbwekeni, were random robberies typical of violent crime in the impoverished townships of South Africa.  (In that case, South African nationals actually assaulted the alleged perpetrator and turned him in to the police).  However, other attacks were more organized.  In Masiphumelele, a township near Ocean View on the Cape Peninsula, groups of youths ransacked several Somali shops.  The police protected the Somali individuals, though not their property, despite having been warned of the impending attacks.  Nearly twenty-five families were forced to take refuge in a church, then a mosque, and finally in a citizen’s home several hours north of the city. 

The provincial government organized an investigative unit several weeks later.  Meetings were held with Somalis and community members to identify the root causes of the dispute.  It was determined that local businessmen had been threatened by the more competitive prices offered by the Somali shop owners, and may have provoked youth to attack the Somali businesses.  The Somalis are now considering new pricing schemes and sharing their business skills with local traders in return for acceptance back into the community.  Several NGOs have also stepped in to offer assistance, including skills training to unemployed youths, and language courses for Somalis.  The police have since made arrests of some of the alleged perpetrators. 

Recognizing that the situation is still unresolved, the provincial government has attempted to facilitate a dialogue amongst relief organizations, but has experienced challenges in identifying the appropriate role of the key actors.  It has now launched an accelerated series of strategy planning meetings.

This response highlights several misconceptions and problems related to the refugee community in South Africa.  First, the conflict has been framed as a business issue, with Somali pricing schemes cast as predatory.  This denies the fact that the local community desires the most competitive prices, and the fact that the bulk prices offered by the Somalis were entirely legal.  The approach also falsely portrays all Somalis as prosperous.  Many are destitute and have no steady accommodation or employment.  Somali businessmen, in other words, represent a fraction of the overall Somali community, which is lumped in with them as greedy merchants. 

Second, framing the conflict as a business issue denies its xenophobic underpinnings.  The Somalis were largely targeted because of their cultural differences.  Third, it ignores the important role of the police, who were warned beforehand but did not respond in time.  Fourth, the proposed solution places the responsibility on the victims of the conflict.  Somalis must adjust their prices, share their business skills, and study English all just to live in the community, when it is their constitutional right to do so.  The business community has made, as far as can be seen, no concessions other than to allow the Somalis to remain – on its terms.  For example, local businessmen can now perform spot-checks on the prices of Somali shops.  This result is certainly the tyranny of the majority over a vulnerable minority.  Fifth, refugee communities are not static.  The ongoing conflict in Somalia continues to produce refugees, and new arrivals cannot be integrated on a short-term basis.  Finally, there are many other refugee groups in Masiphumelele, including Congolese, Burundians, and Angolans.  A quick-fix solution ignores the fact that these groups are also not integrated and have suffered xenophobic attacks as well.  These various groups must be included in the process.

Lessons from Masiphumelele

Many of the difficulties in the conflict arose from a lack of information by locals, refugees, and the government about the rights accorded to Somalis.  Before the attacks, some Somali men were turned away from the police station because they were not citizens.  (The police later acknowledged the mistake and admitted them, but too late).   Refugees themselves are often not aware of their rights and have difficulty accessing services.  The government has attempted to respond to the crisis – and has at least acknowledged it – but seems to favour nationals in its recommendations. 

The Department of Home Affairs has further handicapped refugee communities by failing to provide them with the documentation that would help avert many of the attacks.  Printing IDs efficiently will allow refugees to deposit money in bank accounts, reassure their employers that their status will not be revoked, help them travel abroad, and generally make navigating this ID-obsessed country easier.  IDs must become a priority.  NGOs have responded capably to the crisis, but they are underresourced. 

Training status determination officers to be more culturally sensitive and informed about refugee-producing countries will avert many of the spill-over effects of an inefficient interview. The issue of xenophobia must also be addressed.  Xenophobia should be elevated to a punishable offense–not unlike ‘hate crimes’–by giving the DHA Counter Xenophobia Unit real teeth. Peacebuilding should not be framed as a new burden imposed by refugees, but recognized as an ongoing task of the government.

The Office of the Premier of the Western Cape has been rising to address some of these challenges.  It has established a provincial task team to further consult with the community and to coordinate non-governmental and community-based organizations’ responses on the ground.  Importantly, the task team has been trained in conflict resolution techniques and is meant to serve as an early-warning mechanism for future conflicts, speeding up response times.  Another positive development is that a third voice has emerged in the Masiphumelele community representing South African nationals.  This group, which has not yet chosen a name, argues that the Somalis should not be forced to raise their prices, but rather the opposite; local traders should lower their prices to match those of the Somalis. The development is significant because it reveals that the conflict was improperly framed. It is not just between two parties – the Somalis and local businessmen – but affects additional stakeholders. 

In response to the many shortcomings affecting the Masiphumelele conflict, a series of workshops has been organized to empower key members of the refugee, local, and government communities with knowledge about conflict resolution techniques and their rights.  Called Sustained Advocacy for Empowered Refugees (SAFER), a core group of refugees and asylum seekers will be taken through an extensive course, allowing them to pass on their knowledge to others and prevent conflicts before they erupt.  The hope is that the project will disseminate important knowledge to the greater South African community, and thereby instill a sustainable culture of tolerance.

Conclusion

The strong economy has made South Africa a primary destination for asylum seekers all over the continent and beyond.  However, the Rainbow Nation must strive to provide refugees with the rights guaranteed under law.  Until significant efforts at all levels are made to address these underlying concerns, more conflicts such as that in Masiphumelele may arise.

Deji Olukotun is a California human rights attorney working in Cape Town, South Africa.